Lurkers, Creepers, and Virtuous Interactivity: From Property Rights to Consent to Care as a Conceptual Basis for Privacy Concerns and Information Ethics by Wittkower, D. E.
Old Dominion University
ODU Digital Commons
Philosophy Faculty Publications Philosophy & Religious Studies
2016
Lurkers, Creepers, and Virtuous Interactivity: From
Property Rights to Consent to Care as a
Conceptual Basis for Privacy Concerns and
Information Ethics
D. E. Wittkower
Old Dominion University, dwittkow@odu.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.odu.edu/philosophy_fac_pubs
Part of the Business Law, Public Responsibility, and Ethics Commons, Philosophy Commons,
and the Social Media Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Philosophy & Religious Studies at ODU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Philosophy Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of ODU Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
digitalcommons@odu.edu.
Repository Citation
Wittkower, D. E., "Lurkers, Creepers, and Virtuous Interactivity: From Property Rights to Consent to Care as a Conceptual Basis for
Privacy Concerns and Information Ethics" (2016). Philosophy Faculty Publications. 29.
https://digitalcommons.odu.edu/philosophy_fac_pubs/29
Original Publication Citation
Wittkower, D. (2016). Lurkers, creepers, and virtuous interactivity: From property rights to consent and care as a conceptual basis for








Exchange of personal information online is usually conceptualized according to an economic model that 
treats personal information as data owned by the persons these data are ‘about.’ This leads to a distinct set 
of concerns having to do with data ownership, data mining, profits, and exploitation, which do not closely 
correspond to the concerns about privacy that people actually have. A post-phenomenological perspective, 
oriented by feminist ethics of care, urges us to figure out how privacy concerns arrive in fundamentally 
human contexts and to speak to that, rather than trying to convince people to care about privacy as it is 
juridically conceived and articulated. By considering exchanges of personal information in a human-to-
human online informational economy — being friends on social networking sites — we can identify an 
alternate set of concerns: consent, respect, lurking, and creepiness. I argue that these concerns will provide 
a better guide to both users and companies about prudence and ethics in information economies than the 
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The exchange of information online, particularly through social networking sites (SNS), takes place 
simultaneously in two frames or contexts. We exchange personal information (1) as part of the social 
process of developing intimacy and understanding in personal relationships. Those data are also understood, 
particularly when approached as ‘personally identifiable information’ (PII), (2) as possessions, through the 
circulation of which SNS generate revenue and from the sale of which SNS can extract monetary value. 
We have hitherto privileged the interpretation of exchange of data as possessions, reading back this 
monetary frame of reference upon personal exchanges and holding it as self-evident that persons should 
learn to think like corporations in order to appropriately conduct information exchanges online. Through this 
privileging of monetary economies, privacy becomes the end-user’s responsibility in a juridical model, and it 
appears as common sense that the user can be asked to agree to whatever terms of service (TOS) a 
business cares to ask for and that a user is fully accountable for whatever treatment follows from that 
contractual arrangement. 
I seek to privilege instead the economy of information exchange native to the conduct of personal 
relationships. That economy of intimacy is the one to which people are more accustomed and which appears 
as commonsense in human rather than in juridical terms. It seems to me inevitable that people will think of 
their relationships with one another, and with brands as well, in human terms of care and support, while the 
property-rights-based contractual legal overlay is not at all inevitable, with many or most users having no 
interest, experience, or expertise in reading and thinking through TOS. Furthermore, brands actively engage 
in creating identities that users feel they have personal connections to and actively discourage users from 
dwelling on the monetary and property-based elements of information exchange online, generating prima 
facie responsibility for brands to meet basic norms of interpersonal decency. 
If it is correct that users inevitably conceive of online information economies in terms of personal 
relationships, and that businesses seek to reinforce this interpretation, then it is dishonest and harmful to 
generate best practices by privileging instead the monetary-juridical interpretation of information exchange. 
In other words, if people think about information economies in terms of care, support, and intimacy, and 
businesses want people to think about information economies in this way, then businesses should take 
responsibility for thinking about their end of the relationship in terms of care, support, and intimacy as well. 
By privileging a personal interpretation of information economies over a juridical one we can (a) avoid 
harms generated by users’ expectations of businesses that they will act in ways that fit with the personal 
relationships they project rather than according to the minimally decent standards set by mere legal 
compliance; (b) generate best practices for businesses that support businesses’ own goals of creating 
(monetarily) valuable brand identities and relationships; and (c) better conceive of concerns about ‘privacy’ 
which, under the juridical model of information exchange, doesn’t speak well to users’ experiences or 
concerns. Put briefly, users are frequently told they should care about protecting PII from businesses who 
seek to profit from them, even though users themselves are most often not terribly concerned about 
denying profits from companies that they regularly interact with, often like, and are happy to support and 
partner with. Users, instead, are more often concerned by businesses that hide data practices and that don’t 
act as honest, friendly partners. These ethical concerns — businesses that lurk and are creepy — are best 
understood in terms of economies of information exchange within personal rather than monetary 
relationships. 
In this way, by emphasizing personal interpretations of online information exchange, I hope to provide a 
better basis for public debate about user and provider responsibilities in information use, and to provide a 




This paper presents a portion of a large, long-term research program — a post-phenomenological analysis, 
oriented by feminist ethics of care, of everyday life online. In previous work in this research program, I have 
written on the active practices of friendship online, including the posting of “meaningless” quotidian 
activities, like foodstagramming one’s lunch (Wittkower, 2012a); the role of cute online media in producing 
an “affective supplement” to relationships of care which are experienced as affectively attenuated in the 
absence of face-to-face and body-to-body interactions (Wittkower, 2012b); and how social media can aid 
employees in avoiding bystander apathy in a critical, caring relationship to their employers and 
organizations (Wittkower, 2015a). 
Post-phenomenological analysis is grounded in traditional phenomenology (Heidegger, 1962; Husserl, 1998; 
Merleau-Ponty, 2002; Sartre, 1992), but refocused on small-scale structures of experience (Ihde, 1990). 
Post-phenomenology seeks to objectively describe the structures which create subjective experience within 
particular practices of technologically-mediated living: it is a form of existentialism that leaves behind 
general questions of what it means in the widest sense to be mortal and embodied, asking instead about the 
‘what it’s like’ of particular, concrete, and everyday ways of being. Post-phenomenology is thus the 
philosophical articulation of what it’s like to exist in our particular material circumstances and, in my own 
post-phenomenological work, I seek to describe how digital environments in particular structure our 
experience of others and of ourselves. 
Feminist ethics of care (e.g., Gilligan, 1982; Held, 2006; Noddings, 1984) emphasizes an area of morality 
and the good life that is not adequately addressed by utilitarian, deontological or virtue ethics: the ethics of 
caring relationships between persons. Other more frequently taught ethical theories have difficulty making 
sense of how the favoritism shown by a parent for her child, or by friends for one another, is morally 
acceptable at all, since such preferential consideration violates strong moral norms of objectivity and justice. 
Ethics of care starts from the contrary, but strongly intuitive, perspective that it is, in at least some 
important sense, even immoral to start from a perspective of objectivity within those elements of a good 
human life that have to do with love, care, and personal relationships. Ethics of care does not seek to 
replace other ethical theories, but seeks instead to show that there is more to an ethical life than they easily 
recognize — a no-less-valid and no-less-fundamental ethics that is particular rather than universal, personal 
rather than procedural, and based in care rather than in justice. 
By engaging in post-phenomenological analysis of our lives online, oriented by feminist ethics of care, I hope 
to describe the ‘what-it’s-like’ of everyday processes in the conduct of personal relationships through a focus 
on the moral particularity of activities of care. My belief is that, just as a care-based perspective is able to 
transform some areas of normative ethics by offering alternate and far more common-sense accounts of 
some elements of our moral lives, so too will a post-phenomenology of technology oriented by ethics of care 
be able to transform our understanding of conceptual and practical issues in philosophy of technology and in 
Internet studies. 
Here, I seek to use a post-phenomenological analysis based in ethics of care to reimagine and transform the 
discourse around privacy. 
  
 
3. Privacy and the property-based understanding of personal information 
The conventional wisdom about privacy is that ‘people today’ — millennials, or so-called ‘digital natives’ — 
don’t care about privacy and we need to teach these naïve (yet somehow otherwise presumptively ‘fluent’) 
users of digital media to worry about protecting their data and keeping their information away from others. 
As Grimmelmann (2010a; 2010b) has argued, the conventional wisdom is wrong on both counts: it is very 
clear that digital media users care very much about privacy, but “[t]he privacy they care about is social and 
relational” [1]. They don’t seek privacy in the sense of isolation, especially on what are, after all, social 
networking sites, but instead want to be able to maintain control over how they present themselves to 
others, and when and how others interact with them. ‘Protecting personal data’ is not relevant to privacy in 
a social online context — it provides solitude, not privacy, within social settings and interactions. Perhaps in 
the past, unlike today, having the right kinds of availability to the right kinds of people in the right kinds of 
way did correspond approximately with ‘locking down data’ and ‘not letting other people get your 
information.’ And perhaps this is why we originally adopted a property-rights model of personal information, 
where data is understood as a possession of ours that we want to keep and prevent others from taking. 
From this property-based understanding of personal information, it seems contradictory that someone might 
worry about who can see this or that photo, but not worry about SNS data mining, which results in massive 
profit extraction based on targeted marketing in an online attention economy. Once we consider the 
relationships in which these informational exchanges take place, however, it is obvious that these cases give 
rise to different kinds of concerns. Contrary to the view from a property-rights-based perspective, it is not at 
all incoherent or contradictory to say — as students have told me in classroom discussions — both that “I 
want to make sure I look good in a photo before I let someone tag me in it,” and that “I like targeted ads 
because they show me stuff that I might actually want to buy.” 
A property-based understanding of personal information leads us to falsely think that ‘nobody cares about 
privacy anymore,’ and leads us to privacy education and advocacy efforts which are unlikely to succeed 
because they are mismatched with users’ lived experience. It is unlikely to gain traction to emphasize how 
personal data is worth money and should be kept from circulation when the SNS user’s lived experience is 
that personal information is what you tell your best friends when you need support, or is what creates 
intimacy and care — in other words, that personal information has (affective) value precisely through its 
circulation in personal and mutually beneficial relationships. 
A property-based understanding of personal information has also given rise to a legal system built around 
privacy that is similarly fundamentally misaligned with everyday experience and the human values central to 
everyday social and personal life. 
When Ashley Madison, the infamous adultery ‘dating’ Web site, was hacked, I was surprised to learn that the 
company was trying to suppress publication of its users’ identifying information by issuing Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act (DMCA) takedown notices (Wittkower, 2015b) — that is, by claiming that posting the material 
obtained through the hack infringed on their right, protected under the U.S. DMCA and the U.S. 
Constitution, to earn a profit through exclusive publication rights over their original expressive or creative 
work. Whatever the wrongness of vigilantes outing users of an adultery site might be, it is implausible to 
suggest that it has anything to do with reducing the market for Ashley Madison’s own for-profit publication 
of their users’ names, addresses, sexual fantasies, conversations, and sexts. 
We see a parallel here with the use of copyright law in protection against what is commonly called ‘revenge 
porn’ — the practice of posting images of nudity or sexual activity, depicting a former partner, as a hostile 
act intended to cause harm to her. The victim of revenge porn has little recourse if the images were initially 
taken by her partner with her consent, even if they are reposted without consent and along with potentially 
personally-identifying information. This has allowed revenge porn sites to extort money from women by 
charging a ‘service fee’ to remove anonymously uploaded pictures of them. Only if the image is a selfie and, 
thus, she (rather than her hostile ex) owns the exclusive right to publish the intimate image — for the 
legally-stated purpose of allowing her to profit from such publication and thus “To promote the Progress of 
Science and the useful Arts” (U.S. Constitution, article I, §8, clause 8) — can she issue a DMCA takedown, 
legally requiring the removal of her image. 
In these cases, the property-based understanding of personal information allows us to protect some of the 
right people some of the time, but only by applying it in a context highly divergent from that for which it is 
explicitly intended and justified and without managing to address other, similarly wrong cases. The rightness 
or wrongness of revenge porn should have vanishingly little to do with which partner initially pressed the 
shutter on the camera. 
In the case of child pornography, though, the property-rights model of personal information produces even 
stranger and less appropriate consequences, even though these laws, unlike copyright, are at least about 
the right kind of thing: preventing personal harm rather than ensuring profitability. A person below the age 
of majority — 18 years of age in most of the U.S. — is legally viewed as unable to consent to sexual activity 
because she (or he) is unable to understand the meaning and consequences of this activity, and yet can be 
held responsible under the law for producing child pornography if she takes a picture of herself engaged in 
sexual activity. A minor is thus able, under U.S. law, to be charged with producing child pornography — a 
law explicitly intended to protect children from sexual predators — by photographing herself, alone, engaged 
in a sexual act by herself. Numerous teenagers (mostly girls) have been so charged (Hasinoff, 2015). 
Hasinoff (2015) has produced an excellent and detailed study of the contradictions, absurdities, and sexism 
of debate and legislation about teen sexting, in which, in addition to discussing the above and much more, 
she points out that “sexting is at once a sex act and a speech act” [2]. Hasinoff details how an overemphasis 
on the speech-aspect of the sext has led to a failure to appreciate the relevance of consent, leading to 
problems like the above, or, in other cases, how teens in long-term consensual relationships who can legally 
engage in sexual activity with one another can be subject to child pornography charges if they (with mutual 
and explicit consent) photograph their legal sexual activity [3]. 
In rethinking teen sexting, Hasinoff rightly wants to refocus on consent; in rethinking ‘privacy,’ I want to 





4. Personal information reconceived in the context of relationships 
In the cases above, refocusing on consent and relationships means: (1) following Hasinoff (2015), claiming 
that the photograph itself is not rightly regarded simply as an object, but is better regarded as an act in at 
least some important cases; and (2) following Floridi (2013), claiming that revenge porn is not just an 
intrusion, but an abduction [4]. These follow from considering that the image does not just allow third 
parties to be privy to a prior private moment (personal information transfer), but that the circulation of the 
image also re-creates the sex act in new and ever more numerous contexts, with new and ever more 
numerous non-consensual voyeuristic participants. The sext — an image intended to be a telepresent sex 
act between consenting partners — becomes no longer consensual when later unilaterally shared with third 
parties. Sexual assault, not property rights violation, is the right paradigm in which to think about 
unilaterally forced non-consensual performance of sex acts, even when they are telepresent rather than 
face-to-face. 
A property-based understanding of personal information directs us to ask about legitimate ownership and 
transfer of these data, leading us to troubling consequences like the hostile ex’s right to non-consensually 
publish identifiable images, or the illegality of a minor’s own image of herself, due to her inability to rightly 
transfer her own image to herself. A view to the ethics of care rather than an ethics of justice moves us to 
ask not ‘who has rights over these data?’ but ’what relationship is this part of?’; it leads us to focus on the 
particular, on interaction and consent, and on what is being established and enacted. 
Note how differently, too, consent appears in the context of property transfer and in the context of personal 
relationships. In the former context, ‘informed consent’ guards against fraud, under a general model of 
contract law. In the context of personal relationships, though, consent is not a box to be checked, but 
instead an ongoing relationship of mutual interdependent determination on a consensus model. ‘Consent 
was given’ is only in the former, and not in the latter context, a sufficient justification for doing something 
which one party decides she no longer likes or wants. In the context of sexual consent, should a previously 
consenting partner change her mind (or fall unconscious or become injured), it is obviously wrong for her 
partner to insist upon having the right to continue sexual activity with or without ongoing consent, since 
consent had once been granted. Similarly, in the larger context of personal relationships, a level of intimacy 
granted once cannot and should not be assumed in the future. Children become older and need to be able to 
establish new boundaries. Friendships change and people go through different difficult times differently. 
Being a caring partner in a relationship of any kind requires us to respect negotiation and renegotiation of 
intimacy, rather than insisting upon all access previously granted. 
A central part of what it is required for moving from a property rights understanding of personal information 
to a relationship model of information exchange is recognizing that maintaining ongoing interdependent 
connections with people — something that brands and corporations must do as surely as people — requires 
a form of consent that is negotiated and ongoing and is not simply a box to be checked. 
I will not be able in this paper alone to establish a full theory of privacy newly reconceived from the 
perspective of an ethics of care. I hope, though, to give us a good start in that direction by looking at 
exchanges of personal information as the establishment or conduct of a relationship rather than as transfer 
of ownership of data. The former is, of course, a very commonsense way of understanding economies of 
information exchange in the digitally-unmediated interaction between persons; the novel aspect of this 
paper is the application of this way of making sense of economies of information exchange to the larger 
realm of privacy online — for example, to third-party data harvesting, or to human-company or human-
brand interactions. 
To provide a quick and simple example of the value and relevance of this approach with regard to some of 
our core concerns here, we might note that, while most people are distressingly unmotivated by public, 
justice-related concerns about privacy and ownership of data, many, many more express strong concerns 
when they judge that governments or companies are ‘being creepy,’ a concern whose origin is in the private 
realm of proper (and improper) care in the conduct of personal relationships. By looking at what counts as 
proper or improper economies of information exchange within personal relationships, we can (a) gain a fuller 
understanding of the ethics of data use; (b) gain new tools for engaging with the public about ethical issues 
in data use; and (c) gain new tools that can better orient government, business, and journalists in moral use 
of data. 
In the following, though, the word ‘privacy’ will disappear entirely. In personal relationships, we use the 
word ‘privacy’ to address concerns that can be better and more directly articulated by talking about respect 
and consent. My hypothesis is that the same is true in other relationships of information exchange as well. 
Thus, one of the best paths forward to resolving privacy issues online is to stop talking about ‘privacy’ as 
such and to stop thinking about rights and property, but instead to think about relationships, and to talk 
about respect and consent. 
We will begin by looking at virtuous interactivity in personal relationships (next section). This will include 
looking at vices of inappropriate interactivity: being a lurker and being creepy (sections 6–7). We will look at 
these virtues and vices within an online context, where they are newly an issue for us, and where we are 
newly required to take concrete action to maintain appropriate caring interactivity in our personal 
relationships. This will give us a view of ‘privacy violations’ in the concrete terms and phenomenological 
form in which they appear to us in our interactions with each other. We will be able to see them as part of 
an informational economy oriented around care, respect, and consent, rather than oriented around 
ownership and rights, which can then be applied to human-corporation and human-brand interactions in 
order to provide views on issues of ‘privacy online’ which are directed toward fundamentally human values 
and concerns rather than juridical constructions (section 8). 
  
 
5. The online-emergent virtue of interactivity 
I begin with a puzzling idea: How can a dimension of ethical behavior emerge along with new technology? 
This seems to imply that not only moral beliefs and practices, but morality itself changes along with 
technology. A contentious claim! But not a claim I am making. 
Instead, the change is happening on the other side of the equation, so to speak: it is not that there is a 
change in the moral reasoning which ought to guide our activity within the sphere of human choice, but 
rather that an activity has newly entered into the sphere of human choice, calling for new moral reasoning. 
The values and human goods upon which this new virtue is based are not themselves new. Instead, the 
material circumstances affecting these goods have recently become subject to human choice in significantly 
new and significantly different ways, and so it is newly a requirement of practical reason to determine 
proper grounds of choice — for how could we have reasoned well or poorly in the past about something 
regarding which we had no ability to choose how to act? This new area of moral choice also gives rise to a 
new element of moral character, insofar as it is a new sort of virtuous habit to act well in these new sorts of 
choices. 
Here, although the basic framework is a traditional Aristotelian (1984) virtue ethics, I am also advancing a 
theory of architecturally created latent moral ambiguities — an unusual sort of idea, calling for some 
explanation. The idea proceeds analogically from Larry Lessig’s (2006) idea of architecturally created latent 
ambiguities. Lessig argues that, in the prior “architecture” of books, some rights were given to authors and 
others to consumers simply because those architectures made any other option impossible [5]. If you buy a 
(print) book, are you allowed to lend it to a friend? If you sell a book, are you allowed to conduct market 
research by tracking which parts readers skip? These questions were never asked, because the architectures 
of the physical, printed book already definitively decided the matters: the book did not afford prevention of 
lending, and did not afford reader tracking. Here we have a kind of corollary to the Kantian idea that ‘ought 
implies can:’ inability to act with regard to a set of issues or values renders it exceedingly unlikely that we 
will engage in speculation regarding the morally right set of impossible and possibly inconceivable actions to 
take relative to those issues or values. Little ink has been spilled considering when it is inappropriate to 
think too loudly or at what stage in a social event it is no longer impolite to alter one’s species. 
And so, prior to digital media, we had architecturally-created rights of lending, the doctrine of first sale, and 
rights of anonymous and private reading [6]. Now that new architectures allow publishers greater and 
different controls, these de facto rights have been revealed as latent ambiguities, and prior practices must 
either be affirmed as explicit rights, to be protected by law and by code, or we should become accustomed 
to no longer having them, and stop thinking of them as rights. 
So too, I claim, there are architecturally created latent moral ambiguities. In off-line architectures of 
conduct of personal relationships, the moral value of appropriate interactivity did not need to be affirmed, as 
immediately apparent consequences ensured that pragmatic reasoning was sufficient to determine proper 
action, without recourse to moral reasoning. If you’re listening to someone, should you make eye contact, 
nod, and say ‘uh huh’ from time to time? When you’ve just been introduced to someone, should you take 
pictures of them, ask personal questions, and follow them when they leave? Making these choices never 
before required moral reasoning or virtuous habits, because the architectures of off-line communication 
ensured they would be appropriately and effectively regulated by immediate positive and negative 
reinforcement from the other parties involved. And so, we had a latent virtue of interactivity. 
I have conducted a fuller post-phenomenological analysis of the conditions of self-presentation on SNS 
elsewhere (Wittkower, 2014) — here, it is most relevant to consider what I have addressed there as the 
promiscuous intermixing of audiences [7], the loss of unintentional architectural supports for identity 
management [8], and regional ambivalence [9]. 
In SNS, our audiences are intermixed in a way that is disorienting in relation to the expectations we develop 
in off-line spaces. Rather than interacting in one social context and then another, variously anchored in our 
constitutive communities, we are simultaneously anchored in these constitutive communities, acting in the 
view of, for example, our high school friends, work colleagues, church group, and ex-boyfriends. This 
promiscuous intermixing of audiences on SNS is bound up with and complicated by the loss of architectural 
supports for identity management, including simple facts like walls, time, and space. The localization of my 
availability for perception by others within a span of time and a certain space means that when I am in the 
office, I can act according to its expectations and social boundaries, and can act according to others at the 
club, and all who are mutually co-present at those spaces and times can be expected to have a clear and 
shared context for interaction that aids in determining agreed-upon norms of what kinds of information 
exchange is appropriate, and how quickly it should be forgotten when, for example, we have left the club 
and returned to the office. Even when “privacy settings” for sharing are available and effective, we newly 
have to, for example, “choose to wait to see our doctor only in her waiting room and not simultaneously also 
in our office, our college roommate’s apartment, and our mother–in–law’s living room” when sharing 
information online [10]. This, in turn, creates a regional ambivalence in online spaces, where it is radically 
unclear whether the poster intends to be in a front stage or back stage setting, in Goffman’s (1959) sense, 
or whether front and back regions continue to be separable in contemporary social media environments. 
In these ways and others, architectures that structure, condition, contextualize, and limit information flows 
between persons have disappeared or become subject to choice, leaving much more interpretive and 
relational work to be done by persons. More context often needs to be provided by speakers online, lest they 
be misunderstood, and more awareness of and sensitivity to the lack of context needs to be provided by 
listeners online. This requires new choices about actions online of listeners as well as of speakers — even 
when and whether to indicate at all that they are ‘in on’ a SNS conversation that they are reading. Unless 
we are simply to become accustomed to ‘lurkers’ and ‘creepers,’ and stop thinking of these behaviors as 
inappropriate, we must affirm a virtue of appropriately responsive interactivity, and learn to act properly 
towards it. 
To sum this up: SNSs present a newfound potential for asymmetric information exchanges in the conduct of 
personal relationships. In face-to-face conduct of personal relationships, information transfer between 
persons tends to reach equilibrium both in degree and kind, through two primary mechanisms, discussed 
above: (1) contexts of interaction tend to create a common set of informational expectations, and (2) 
constant recalibration and negotiation are possible in synchronous one-on-one or small-group interactions, 
guided by microtransactions of encouragement or discouragement, such as head nods or selective 
disattention. 
On SNSs, in the absence of these contextual delimiters and cues, information asymmetries become 
increasingly common and in ways to which we are unaccustomed. We are called upon to develop virtuous 
habits of interaction allowing others to see that we are attending to them in the right way, to the right 
extent, and in the right circumstances. 
In order to provide a fuller definition of this emergent virtue of interactivity in personal information 
economies, we will look at its related vices, since as with many or perhaps even most virtues, interactivity is 
probably best understood by contrast with its related vices: lurking, a vice consisting in an inappropriate 
deficit of interaction, and creeping, a vice consisting in an inappropriate excess of interaction. 
  
 
6. Being a lurker 
A lurker remains party to an interaction without signaling her presence within it. For the lurked-upon, this 
lack of appropriate signals of informational reception may produce an experience of coveillance (Mann, et 
al., 2003), in which the lurker appears similar to an eavesdropper, an undisclosed listener-in. The lurker, on 
the other hand, may believe she is a normal party to the interaction if she is not aware of the technical 
circumstances that newly demand interactivity as a matter of moral attention and activity. This undermines 
consent and respect in information exchange, since it deprives the lurked-upon of the ability to know what is 
known about her, and the opportunity to regulate her sharing in order to shape her relationship with others. 
Often, SNS communications are not targeted, but may be sent out to an entire network. The sender may not 
remember who exactly is within the network, and it is particularly likely that users may forget about less 
active members of their network, since they appear infrequently to the user. This tendency may not be 
apparent to those less-SNS-active users, who may instead reasonably proceed with the assumption that 
they are within the group of intended and known recipients. The result is that users whose SNS consumption 
habits significantly outstrip their SNS production habits, and who do not recalibrate for this imbalance 
through microtransactions of liking, commenting, or sharing, are likely to become lurkers without any 
awareness that they will be perceived as such by others. 
The lurker may come to feel that the partners are in community in an intimate ‘backstage’ setting (Goffman, 
1959) while the lurked-upon is surprised, upon the breaking of the lurker’s silence, to discover that she’s 
‘been in the room this whole time.’ The lurker attends to others without appropriately announcing her 
attendance: this diminishes the autonomy of others in managing their personal data flows relative to the 
lurker. 
By failing to create a reciprocal co-presence, the lurker creates an informational disequilibrium, which results 
in very different affective orientations by constitutive parties of the relationship. Over time, the lurker may 
grow to feel quite close to the lurked-upon through experiences of ambient awareness which, in non-digital 
environments, are attended by significant mutual engagement, such as the day-to-day chats about 
ephemeral minutiae which are of so little importance that they take place mostly among close friends. In a 
non-SNS social context, work colleagues and distant relatives know about important personal and 
professional changes; only close friends know about your views on the merits of different sorts of pizza 
toppings, or your personal aesthetic disfavor for the word ‘moist,’ not because these latter attributes are 
sensitive or private, but instead because they are unremarkable, uninteresting, and unimportant. These 
trivialities, rising not even to the prominence of marginalia in the story of our lives, create intimacy even 
though they call for neither privacy nor secrecy. The concern with lurking (and with creeping, as we will see) 
is thus not a matter of control or access, but of equilibrium and exchange: the proper way of reading our 
concern with contextual integrity (Nissenbaum, 2004), in this case at least, is not as a public policy concern 
for maintaining responsive controls over privacy, but instead as a personal concern for maintaining 
responsive controls over intimacy. 
  
 
7. Being a creeper 
A creeper signals presence within too many interactions, interactions of the wrong sort, or in a way 
disproportionate to interactants’ responses. Examples might include someone who ‘likes’ all of his niece’s 
spring break photos — communications within a social context where his interest in being a recipient in this 
nominally public informational space may appear improper — someone who regularly likes and shares posts 
from someone who never reciprocates, or who persists in regularly writing comments which are not 
responded to or, generally speaking, is overly attached. 
Intensive or high-volume bilateral information transfer creates intimacy, even when the information is fully 
public — for example, two people simply looking into one another’s eyes steadily and at length. Such an 
information transfer is creepy when done unilaterally and without reciprocation, even when the information 
is not sensitive — again, public staring provides a good, creepy example. Creepy behavior undermines 
respect and consent by treating all technically available information as appropriately transferable. It fails to 
note that the unilateral transfer of information may create an experience of intimacy, which the creeped-
upon would prefer to be mutual and consensual rather than unilateral — if ‘unilateral intimacy,’ instead of 




Figure 1: Instance of Overly Attached Girlfriend, original author Laina 
Morris [11]. 
  
This inappropriate excess of signals of informational reception may produce an experience of harassment for 
the creeped-upon, in many ways analogous to stalking, but, as with lurking, this may occur on SNS without 
the awareness of the creeper, who may believe she is a normal interactant. 
In our new communicative technical ecosystem we may not yet be well-attuned to monitoring who may be 
sick of hearing us chime in on their personal business, even when the side-eyed dis-invitation to participate 
in future personal commentary would be abundantly palpable were we to conduct ourselves this way in a 
face-to-face context. And, as with lurking, there are reasonable prima facie reasons for the creeper to begin 
from and maintain the presumption that she has been invited to be a proper and welcome party to these 
interactions as an accepted member within the creeped-upon’s network of communicants. 
By failing to appropriately scale interactions to interactant reciprocation, the creeper creates an 
informational disequilibrium. The creeper attends to others in inappropriate ways, becoming too present too 
often, and too unreservedly. This is a failure to use norms as an appropriate secondary regulatory system to 
code — that is, the primary architectural settings of the SNS wherein a user is included or excluded from 
another user’s network and allowed or disallowed technical access to a given communication through its 
privacy settings — failing to note that a communication’s accessibility to a communicant is not necessarily 
sufficient reason to conclude that the communicant is its intended or appropriate audience. 
In SNS communications, we regularly speak simultaneously to multiple audiences and thus depend on 
recipients to self-censor their presence within interactions — a new version of the civil inattention [12] which 
we depend on to maintain appropriate and comfortable personal boundaries in off-line spaces where 
architectures are insufficient on their own. When off-line architectures are insufficient to provide appropriate 
interpersonal boundaries, we supplement those architectures with moral norms by, for example, not taking 
part in a conversation between two people standing in front of us on the subway, despite being all but 
required to be a party to that conversation by the amoral facts of proximity and the physics of sound. So 
too, we must recognize that not all conversations to which we are party on SNS, through the not-entirely 
customizable architectures of sharing and posting, are conversations in which we are in fact welcome. Care 
and respect for others demand that we not treat contingent non-denial of access as equivalent to consent, 
but that we are instead mindful of the limits architectures may place on choice, treading lightly or seeking 
out explicit consent when it is unclear whether we have been invited, whether we have failed by oversight to 
be dis-invited, or whether our dis-invitation was simply impractical or impracticable. 
  
 
8. Broader applications 
With these discussions of lurking and creeping in hand, virtuous interactivity in personal economies of 
information exchange can be given a brief definition. To be virtuously interactive is to attend to others in 
ways that appropriately signals your appropriate attention — that is, with appropriate frequency and with 
appropriate response to others’ recognition of your attention, respecting them as an equal partner in 
constructing the relationship, and limiting information appropriately by consent. In practical terms, much of 
the cultivation of this virtue has to do with these qualifications of actions as ‘appropriate,’ and while this may 
appear to be a weakness in this definition, it is in Aristotle’s view (although not precisely in his phrasing) a 
feature rather than a bug. What is appropriate for each of us and in each situation and in each relationship 
will and should change. Aristotle points out that an appropriate amount of food for Milo (a wrestler) would 
be vastly excessive for most other people [13]. So too some of us may thrive by living out in the open, 
freely sharing personal thoughts and details, while others may be happier and healthier keeping more to 
themselves and to a few intimate others — and in either case, the appropriate level of interactivity for a 
user’s best friend is probably vastly excessive for a user’s new work contact. 
We have a great deal of experience with propriety in the conduct of personal relationships — although it 
may well be the case that some of us are far better at determining propriety than others — and so the main 
challenge for human interactants is becoming accustomed to having to proactively engage in interactive 
behaviors within new technical environments which do not architecturally prompt such behaviors. 
Things are far more uncertain regarding propriety in the conduct of relationships between persons and non-
persons, and it is here that this analysis might bear the most fruit. In the majority of brand and corporate 
interactions, public relations and social media professionals are able to draw on intuitions drawn from 
personal relationships in order to be appropriately responsive to human interactants. However, this is 
complicated by the singularity of the human and multiplicity of the non-human party, leading to a significant 
information gap regarding the history of interaction within the relationship — so, for example, a corporate 
social media representative has access only to the immediate present interaction, while the brand she 
represents may have been actively or passively present in a long history of interactions on the part of the 
human involved. In the case of a suicidal posting on the Mountain Dew Facebook page (Figure 2), although 
Abraham later described his post as “a joke” (Greene, 2011), it may be unexpected but not implausible that 
someone would have a history of interaction with the brand of a nature which would in fact cause him to 
turn to it while in the thrall of the helplessness and uncertainty of suicidal ideation. It is worthy of further 
note that, among all the persons present in this interaction, it is the Mountain Dew representative — the 




Figure 2: Suicidal note posted to Mountain Dew’s Facebook page [14]. 
  
In other kinds of cases, however, it may be less clear that a non-person is able to act in ways that fit more-
or-less within the ethics of care in the conduct of personal relationships, because of some combination of 
factors, including (1) that the interaction might occur within a primarily economic or technical impersonal 
context, to which care seems ill-suited; (2) that the interaction might include new kinds of action only 
recently made possible, as in the discussion of latent ambiguities and virtues above, which are of a newly 
personal nature and which we are therefore unaccustomed to thinking of in the context of moral choice; and 
(3) that the history of interaction in this context, while newly personal, may have been historically ‘just 
business’ or historically non-interactive, leading to a newly incorrect preconception of that sphere of activity 
as subject only to universal and public concerns of justice rather than interactive and personal concerns of 
care. 
A systematic exploration of such applications is well beyond the scope of this preliminary articulation of the 
virtue of interactivity, and I hope that a small sampling of some such cases will suffice to indicate this 
direction of future research and the utility of the preceding model to such investigation. 
8.1. The right to be forgotten 
Google seeks to deliver the results users find most valuable, not the results that would result in an 
insensitive and decontextualized keyword search. By taking into account a user’s location, search history, 
and other attributes when available, Google has sought to customize search results to deliver not the most 
objectively relevant results (whatever that might mean), but the most subjectively relevant results. In so 
doing, Google has very clearly invested in a model of responsive interaction and it is unsurprising that users 
may expect attributes of care within a service which takes on attributes of a research assistant along with 
those of a card catalog. Since, however, it does so by using data in ways of which the user is unaware and 
cannot modify, like a lurker, it denies the user the ability to be aware of and regulate their relationship, as a 
respectful, consensual relationship requires. 
Furthermore, in contrast to the architectural ‘forgetting’ that takes place in ephemeral non-digital media, the 
presentism of Google search produces a tone-deaf insensitivity to the natural process of personal change. 
Like an old friend who seems to only know the person we regret to admit that we used to be, and who tags 
us in drunken photos from decades ago in full view of our family and office mates, Google can’t take a hint. 
Considered together, and considered along with the efficacy of Google’s Web crawlers and the general 
inability of persons appearing as content on others’ Web sites to delimit access through a robots.txt, Google 
is creepy, and, insofar as we use it to google others, threatens to make lurkers of us all. Google stares at us 
in a disrespectful, non-consensual way, unresponsive to messages we may send about what kinds of looking 
are welcome or unwelcome. 
Now, of course, in this case and in others, there may be competing interests from different ongoing 
relationships. For example, we may want Google to recognize and be responsive to who we are, but our 
concern with ‘the right to be forgotten’ should be limited by others’ legitimate interests in information 
access. Google’s relationship of trust and partnership in information access with other users means that 
when they search for our criminal record, Google will tell them about it, even though maybe it shouldn’t 
necessarily be the first thing Google says about us as soon as our name comes up. Relationships are tough, 
and you have to make difficult choices sometimes. 
8.2. Responsivity in media ethics 
Previous journalistic architectures required reporting about people by producing non-responsive artifacts. 
This strongly contrasts with the conversational and interpersonal process of the journalistic interview and, 
even when reporting does not follow from an interview, is often uncomfortably ill matched with the personal 
nature of the information being reported. The non-responsivity of journalistic artifacts is increasingly 
troubling as more news takes place or finds a place online, becoming subject to the presentism already 
addressed in the Google case above. 
We should explore new ways of thinking about journalism as reporting with rather than reporting about, 
giving subjects of reportage ways of responding to, participating in, and intervening in that reporting, and 
allowing that reporting to be responsive to changes over time — even if this responsivity is limited to 
something like providing subjects the option to add a link of their choice at the top of an old story as an 
‘update.’ 
Consent to being subject to reportage — being interviewed, for example — meant one thing during an era of 
print, when the interviewee’s relationship with the publication (and hence the publisher) was sharply limited 
in time, with the newspaper or television report appearing ‘current’ only for a matter of days, then 
disappearing from public dialogue and usually public knowledge, existing thereafter only in shadowy, 
archival form. New media reports tend to appear ‘current’ far longer, popping up as soon as an interviewee’s 
name is entered into a search engine, especially if she is not a public figure who is often reported on and 
who has her own Web presence. Like the circulation of sexts in revenge porn, the journalistic report keeps 
bringing a past, contextual self into the present again and again, without that context, and without consent 
for each re-contextualized re-enactment of that prior performance. The kind of consent required by a 
respectful and bilateral long-term relationship requires different considerations and negotiations than what 
was required for the mostly short-term relationships interviewees and subjects had with articles, journalists, 
and publications in an age of print-only media. 
8.3. Appropriate transparency in end-user licensing agreements (EULAs) 
Even with traditional commodities, we enter into ongoing relationships in which an ethics of care can be 
expected to emerge in the consumer experience. A particular vacuum cleaner or bag of oranges will have its 
particular attributes and stand or fall on its own merits, but our relationship with a brand continues beyond 
each product, and brands seek exactly the sort of consumer trust which is inclusive of both (a) the public 
justice-based concerns of truth in advertising, fair pricing, and product safety, and (b) the care-based 
concerns of brand-identity, trust, and positive affective associations. 
Those brands which request or require personal information, or which seek control over our (virtual) actions, 
enter into a private realm in which we should expect users to adopt increasingly care-based kinds of 
concerns. Certainly, for example, a company which stores or transmits our photographs (e.g., Facebook) is 
found in our day-to-day conduct of identity and community in significant, homey, and intimate ways, and 
building a relationship of trust between the brand and its human hosts seems central to the brand’s survival 
and success. 
Even a mere moment of reflection on what a care-based approach to the relationship between brands and 
persons might look like should make clear that posting a privacy policy and making users click through a 
license is not the kind of presence or transparency required for a respectful, consensual, bilateral, and 
mutually-determining relationship. Virtuous interactivity in an ongoing personal customer-provider 
relationship of this kind must involve regular check-ins, which treat the user — and explicitly and believably 
promise to treat the user — as a partner in a mutually beneficial consensual relationship. 
8.4. Personalized services 
Targeted advertising seeks to strike a difficult balance between being ineffective and creepy. Viewing the 
brand-person relationship through a perspective of care can help to approach users and consumers in an 
effective and less troubling way by offering users/consumers more responsive and transparent opportunities 
to invite and dis-invite brands into their lives. 
We can find a couple of limit cases to see what’s at stake here. First, there is the famous, although possibly 
apocryphal [15], case of Target’s surprisingly effective targeted advertising toward expectant mothers. As 
reported in the New York Times: 
About a year after Pole created his pregnancy-
prediction model, a man walked into a Target 
outside Minneapolis and demanded to see the 
manager. He was clutching coupons that had been 
sent to his daughter, and he was angry, according to 
an employee who participated in the conversation. 
“My daughter got this in the mail!” he said. “She’s 
still in high school, and you’re sending her coupons 
for baby clothes and cribs? Are you trying to 
encourage her to get pregnant?” 
The manager didn’t have any idea what the man was 
talking about. He looked at the mailer. Sure enough, 
it was addressed to the man’s daughter and 
contained advertisements for maternity clothing, 
nursery furniture and pictures of smiling infants. The 
manager apologized and then called a few days later 
to apologize again. 
On the phone, though, the father was somewhat 
abashed. “I had a talk with my daughter,” he said. 
“It turns out there’s been some activities in my 
house I haven’t been completely aware of. She’s due 
in August. I owe you an apology.” [16] 
This is clearly an excess of interaction, and is indeed probably a paradigm case of corporations being creepy. 
The store was certainly not invited into the intimate informational space where this young woman did not 
(yet) invite her own father, and this is certainly not the sort of news that he wanted (or could have 
reasonably expected) to hear first from a multinational corporation. 
There is also clearly an aspect of the lurker in all this. Brands tend not to make clear how much they are 
listening in on our interactions — building up, mining, exploiting, and selling customer profiles through 
loyalty cards, purchasing habits, trackers gathering Internet browsing habits after we leave their Web pages 
— and so when a tellingly specific banner ad or, in this case, mass-produced mailer, signals that the 
corporation has been there all along, listening in, it is unsurprising that we feel surveilled and eavesdropped-
upon. 
But the issue here is not that we simply want businesses to not get up in our business at all. It’s that we 
want them to do so in a responsive, respectful way. With targeted advertising in particular, this takes the 
form of personal recognition. 
Consider a different limit case. What if Amazon simply suggested that you should listen to Beyoncé and the 
Beatles, and read Tom Clancy and Stephen King? Or what if Netflix kept insisting that you should watch the 
newest Transformers movie, Tom Cruise vehicle, or ‘holiday’ (read: Christmas) special? We want these 
services to respond to us not simply by indicating what a lot of people like, but instead by responding to the 
particularity of the behavior we have exhibited. Telling us what’s popular might be interesting or useful, and 
by all means do listen to Beyoncé and the Beatles, but recognition of us personally is required to tell us what 
people like us also enjoy, and that provides a responsive aesthetic partnership that offers distinctive benefits 
to both users and companies. 
When these services don’t use our data in a way that indicates responsive recognition of who we are, they 
simply fail to serve their function — and when they mostly do well, but occasionally misrecognize how we 
identify ourselves through our taste-cultures, we in fact can find this insulting. I’ve heard friends distraught 
by the selections showing up on their Pandora radio stations, showing that, despite these occasional off-base 
selections, the service has succeeded in gaining their trust in its judgments based on their perception that it 
recognizes them. When sufficient trust in the insights of the service have been gained, especially when users 
have invested significant effort and self-disclosure in training these algorithms through the detailed and 
ongoing work of providing ratings and up- and down-votes of content, users may in fact find the service’s 
judgment to have real bearing upon their character. “What have I done,” they ask themselves with some 
amount of self-recrimination, “to make Pandora think that I would like Nickelback?” 
It is this sort of personal recognition which personalized services, including targeted advertising, should 
strive for — the kind in which the customer feels appropriately recognized by the service provider. This 
means being recognized in her specificity to whatever degree she is comfortable with, in a way that is clear 
to her, and which is responsive to her control. If the user is able to access and correct profiles about her, 
and if it is transparent how this information is being used, and how (and that) it benefits the consumer for 
these profiles to be both detailed and accurate, it seems like customers will often gladly provide additional 
information and, in fact, as in cases like Pandora and Netflix, invest considerable time in providing personal 
preferences in order to get more responsive recommendations from the predictive system. 
This final case in particular may be a useful example of why an ethics of care has already been adopted by 
consumers in response to non-person interactants and why it should also be adopted by those non-persons 
in relating to consumers. Business models which depend upon users providing personal information and 
which seek to involve themselves in intimate situations and environments cannot sustainably continue to 
treat their human partners as mere economic actors subject to contract law in purely impersonal and 
commercial interactions. Non-person actors in these informational economies are asking for persons to 
engage in informational exchanges characteristic of personal relationships of care, and must demonstrate 
care in return if these business models are to be effective. ‘Don’t be evil’ sets too low a bar — as does 
avoiding force and fraud, or acting according to rights and contract. 
In an age of corporate interactions, corporations must be interactive, and must be virtuously interactive: 
they should attend to user-customers in a way that appropriately signals their appropriate attention with 
appropriate frequency and with appropriate responsivity to user-consumer recognition of their attention, 
building consensual relationships that show respect for user-consumers. They must, in short, demonstrate 
moral recognition and care.  
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